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)Z- 


62 d Congress, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, j Report 
2d Session . f (No. 946. 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD, JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES 
COMMERCE COURT. 


July 8, 1912.—Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed. 



Mr. Clayton, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 

following 


REPORT. 

[To accompany H. Res. 524.] 

The Committee on the Judiciary, having had under consideration 
House resolution 524, make the following report: 

The resolution is in the following words: 

Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be, and is hereby, authorized to 
inquire into and concerning the official conduct of Honorable Robert W. Archbald, 
formerly district judge of the United States Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl¬ 
vania, and now a judge of the Commerce Court, touching his conduct in regard to the 
matters and things mentioned in House Resolution numbered five hundred and 
eleven, and especially whether said judge has been guilty of an impeachable offense, 
and to report to the House the conclusions of the committee in respect thereto, with 
appropriate recommendation; 

And resolved further, That the Committee on the Judiciary shall have power to send 
for persons and papers, and to subpoena witnesses and to administer oaths to such 
witnesses; and for the purpose of making this investigation said committee is authorized 
to sit during the sessions of this House; and the Speaker shall have authority to sign 
and the Clerk to attest subpoenas for any witness or witnesses. 

Origin of this Impeachment. 

This impeachment proceeding had its origin in the resolution 
adopted by the House of Representatives on April 25, 1912, which 
is set out in the following message of the President to the House of 
Representatives on May 3, 1912: 

To the House of Representatives: 

I am in receipt of a copy of a resolution adopted by the House on April 25, reading 
as follows: 

“ Resolved, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, requested, 
if not incompatible with the public interest, to transmit to the House of Representatives 
a copy of any charges filed against Robert W. Archbald, associate judge of the United 
States Commerce Court, together with the report of any special attorney or agent 









ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


2 

appointed by the Department of Justice to investigate such charges, and a copy of any 
and all affidavits, photographs, and evidence filed in the Department of Justice in 
relation to said charges, together with a statement of the action of the Department of 
Justice, if any, taken upon said charges and report.” 

In reply, I have to state that, in February last, certain charges of improper conduct 
by the Hon. Robert W. Archbald, formerly district judge of the United States court 
for the middle district of Pennsylvania, and now judge of the Commerce Court, were 
brought to my attention by Commissioner Meyer of the Interstate Commerce Commis¬ 
sion. I transmitted these charges to the Attorney General, by letter dated February 
13, instructing him to investigate the matter, confer fully with Commissioner Meyer, 
and have his agents make as full report upon the subject as might be necessary, and, 
should the charges be established sufficiently to justify proceeding on them, bring the 
matter before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives. 

The Attorney General has made a careful investigation of the charges, and as a 
result of that investigation has advised me that, in his opinion, the papers should be 
transmitted to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House to be used by them as a 
basis for an investigation into the facts involved in the charges. I have, therefore, 
directed him to transmit all of the papers to the Committee on the Judiciary; but in 
my opinion—and I think it will prove in the opinion of the committee—it is not 
compatible with the public interests to lay all these papers before the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives until the Committee on the Judiciary shall have sifted them out and de¬ 
termined the extent to which they deem it essential to the thoroughness of their in¬ 
vestigation not to make the same public at the present time. But all of the papers 
are in the hands of the committee and, therefore, within the control of the House. 

Wm. H. Taft. 

The White House, May 3, 1912. 

Inquiry into the Alleged Misconduct of Judge Archbald. 

Your committee began the hearings under House Resolution 524 
hereinbefore set out on May 7, 1912, and concluded such hearings on 
June 4, 1912. The testimony was taken by the committee in open 
session from day to day or from time to time until concluded. At 
the hearings witnesses were sworn and examined, and Judge Arch¬ 
bald was present in person and was represented by counsel in 
accordance with his request made of the committee. His counsel 
was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses. 

The testimony taken by the committee is now presented to the 
House, but on account of its volume it is deemed not advisable to have 
the same again printed in extenso as a part of this report. A copy of 
such testimony and of the proceedings had at the hearings in this 
matter is, however, accessible to each Member of the House. 

Judge Archbald's Appointment. 

Robert W. Archbald was appointed in vacation a United States 
district judge for the middle district of Pennsylvania and was duly 
commissioned as such judge on the 29th day of March, 1901, as appears 
from his commission, which is in the following words and figures: 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


3 



a 


William McKinley, 

President of the United States of America. 

To all who shall see these presents , greeting: 

Know ye, that, reposing special trust and confidence in the wisdom, uprightness, 
and learning of Robert Wodrow Archbald, of Pennsylvania, I do appoint him United 
States district judge for the middle district of Pennsylvania, as provided for by act 
approved March 2, 1901, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the 
duties of that office according to the Constitution and laws of the said United States, 
and to have and to hold the said office, with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments 
to the same of right appertaining, unto him, the said Robert Wodrow Archbald, until 
the end of the next session of the Senate of the United States, and no longer, subject 
to the conditions and provisions prescribed by law. 

In testimony whereof I have caused these letters to be made patent and the seal 
of the Department of Justice to be hereunto affixed. 

Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, the 29th day of March, in the 
year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one, and of the independence of 
the United States of America the one hundred and twenty-fifth. 

[seal.] William McKinley. 

By the President: 

John W. Griggs, 

A ttorney General. 


After the vacation and upon the convening of Congress, Robert 
W. Archbald was appointed a United States district judge for the 
middle district of Pennsylvania and was duly commissioned as such 
judge on the 17th day of December, 1901, as appears from his com¬ 
mission, which is in the following words and figures: 

Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States of America. 


To all who shall see these presents , greeting: 

Know ye, that, reposing special trust and confidence in the wisdom, uprightness, 
and learning of Robert W. Archbald, of Pennsylvania, I have nominated, and by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, do appoint him United States District 
Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and do authorize and empower him to 
execute and fulfill the duties of that office according to the Constitution and laws of 
the said United States, and to have and to hold the said office, with all the powers, 
privileges, and emoluments to the same of right appertaining, unto him, the said 
Robert W. Archbald, during his good behavior. 

In testimony whereof I have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal 
of the Department of Justice to be hereunto affixed. 

Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, the 17th day of December, in 
the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and one, and of the independence 
of the United States of America the one hundred and twenty-sixth. 

[seal.] Theodore Roosevelt. 

By the President: 

P. C. Knox, 

Attorney General. 

The said Robert W. Archbald was duly appointed an additional 
circuit judge of the United States from the third judicial circuit and 
designated as a judge of the United States Commerce Court, ar»d was 


4 Robert w. archbald. 

confirmed by the Senate and was duly commissioned as such judge 
on the 31st day of January, 1911, as will appear from his commission-, 
which is in the following words and figures, to wit: 

William H. Taft, President of the United States of America. 

To all who shall see these presents , greeting: 

Know ye that, reposing special trust and confidence in the wisdom, uprightness, 
and learning of Robert Wodrow Archbald, of Pennsylvania, I have nominated, and, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, do appoint him additional circuit 
judge of the United States from the third judicial circuit, and do authorize and 
empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of that office according to the Constitu¬ 
tion and laws of the said United States, and to have and to hold the said office, with 
all the powers, privileges, and emoluments to the same of right appertaining, unto 
him, the said Robert Wodrow Archbald, during his good behavior. Appointed 
pursuant to the act of June 18, 1910 (36 Stats., 540), and hereby designated to serve 
for four years in the Commerce Court. 

In testimony whereof I have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal 
of the Department of Justice to be hereunto affixed. 

Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, the thirty-first day of January, 
in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eleven, and of the independ¬ 
ence of the United States of America the one hundred and thirty-fifth. 

[seal.] William H. Taft. 

By the President: 

George W. Wickersham, 

Attorney General. 

The Facts. 

The facts found by your committee are substantially as follows: 

THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE HILLSIDE COAL & IRON CO. RELATIVE 
TO THE KATYDID CULM DUMP AT MOOSIC, PA. 

[See Article 1.] 

On or about March 31, 1911, Judge Archbald entered into a part¬ 
nership agreement with one Edward J. Williams, of Scranton, Pa., 
for the purchase of a certain culm dump known as the Katydid 
culm dump, located near Moosic, Lackawanna County, Pa., for the 
purpose of disposing of the said property at a pecuniary profit to 
themselves. 

Most of the coal contained in this culm dump was taken from 
land known as the Caldwell lot, which is owned in fee simple by the 
Hillside Coal & Iron Co. The larger portion of the dump now 
rests on land known as Lot 46, which is jointly owned by the Hill¬ 
side Coal & Iron Co. and the Everhart estate. The entire capital 
stock of the Hillside Coal & Iron Co. is owned by the Erie Railroad 
Co. and a number of the managing officers and directors of the 
railroad company are also managing officers and directors of the 
coal company. The Katydid dump was formed from the opera- 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


5 


tion of the Katydid colliery by the firm of Robertson & Law, and 
later by John M. Robertson, who succeeded the firm, which oper¬ 
ated the colliery under a verbal agreement to pay the Hillside Coal 
& Iron Co. certain royalties on all coal mined. It appears that the 
Everhart estate received certain royalties from the Hillside Coal 
& Iron Co. for all coal above the size of pea taken from the tract in 
which the Everhart estate held a one-half undivided interest. The 
plant was operated from 1887 to 1909, when the breaker and washery 
were destroyed by fire, and since then the operation has been aban¬ 
doned by Robertson. 

In furtherance of his agreement with Williams, Judge Archbald 
used his official position as judge of the Commerce Court, on March 
31, 1911, and at various other times, by correspondence, personal 
conferences, and otherwise, to improperly induce and influence 
the officers of the Hillside Coal & Iron Co. and the Erie Railroad 
Co. to enter into an agreement with himself and Williams to sell 
the interest of the Hillside Coal & Iron Co. in the Katydid culm 
dump for a consideration of $4,500, against the policy and practice 
of the Erie Railroad Co. and its subsidiary, the Hillside Coal & 
Iron Co. 

Judge Archbald and Williams then secured an option to purchase 
whatever equity Robertson held in this property for a consideration 
of $3,500 and entered into negotiations with several parties with a 
view to the sale of the culm dump at a large profit. One of these 
parties was the manager of an electric railroad who was then pur¬ 
chasing large quantities of coal consumed in the operation of the 
road from the Hillside Coal & Iron Co. at the usual market rates. 
It was claimed that there were certain complications in the title to 
this property; but however this may be, Judge Archbald considered 
that the options from the Hillside Coal & Iron Co. and Robertson 
covered the entire interest in the dump, and so stated in a letter to 
this prospective purchaser. 

After*a careful survey a disinterested mining engineer estimates 
that the Katydid culm dump contains about 90,000 gross tons, of 
which approximately 46,704 tons are marketable coal. This coal is 
appraised by the engineer at $47,533.18, subject to an increase of 
$3,803.40 provided that an increment of small coal can be saved in 
the process of reclamation. It is further estimated that the opera¬ 
tion of this culm dump by the Hillside Coal & Iron Co. would net it 
approximately $35,000 and that the Erie Railroad Co. would realize 
a profit in the neighborhood «of. $35,000 for the transportation of the 
coal to tidewater, making a total profit to the Erie and its subsidiary 
of about $70,000. 


6 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


During the period covering these negotiations with the officers of 
the Hillside Coal & Iron Co. and the Erie Railroad*Co. Judge Arch¬ 
bald was a United States circuit judge, duly assigned to serve in the 
Commerce Court, and the Erie Railroad Co., a common carrier en¬ 
gaged in interstate commerce, was a party litigant in certain suits 
then pending in the Commerce Court and known as The Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad Co. et al. v. The Interstate Commerce Commission, 
No. 38, and The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al. v. The Inter¬ 
state Commerce Commission, No. 39. In the opinion of your com¬ 
mittee Judge Archbald’s participation in this transaction, under all 
the circumstances, was reprehensible and prejudicial to the confi¬ 
dence of the American people in the Federal judiciary. 

THE ATTEMPT TO SELL THE STOCK OF THE MARIAN COAL CO. TO THE 
DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA & WESTERN RAILROAD CO. 

[See Article 2.] 

On October 18, 1910, the Marian Coal Co., which operated a 
washery at Taylor, Pa., filed a complaint against the Delaware, 
Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. and several other railroads 
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, containing a demand 
for reparation for damages alleged to have been suffered by the 
complainant in the amount of $55,238.27, with interest, for over¬ 
charges and discriminations in freight rates; and concluding with a 
prayer that the Interstate Commerce Commission issue an order 
requiring the defendants to cease various acts alleged to have been 
committed for the purpose of suppressing the competition of the 
complainant in the coal market, and establishing just and reason¬ 
able rates upon commodities shipped by the complainant from its 
washery at Taylor, Pa., to all points within the jurisdiction of the 
commission. 

Some time in July or August, 1911, William P. Boland and Chris¬ 
topher G. Boland, who were the controlling stockholders of the 
Marian Coal Co., employed one George M. Watson, of Stranton, 
Pa., as an attorney to effect a sale of two-thirds of the stock of the 
Marian Coal Co. to the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad 
Co., and to settle this case which was still pending before the Com¬ 
merce Commission. The decision of the Interstate Commerce Com¬ 
mission in this case was subject to review by the Commerce Court, 
and there was at that time pending in the Commerce Court a suit 
entitled “The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al. v. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission, No. 38,” to which the Delaware, Lacka¬ 
wanna & Western Railroad Co. was a party litigant. 

With full knowledge of these facts, Judge Archbald entered into 
an agreement to assist George M. Watson, for a valuable considera- 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


7 


tion, to sell the stock of the Marian Coal Co., held by the Bolands, 
to the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. and settle 
the case between the said coal company and the railroad company. 
In pursuance of this agreement, Judge Archbald by means of corre¬ 
spondence, personal conferences, and otherwise persistently 
attempted to induce the officers of the Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western Railroad Co. to enter into an agreement with Watson to 
settle the case then pending before the Interstate Commerce Com¬ 
mission and purchase the stock of the Marian Coal Co. at a highly 
exorbitant price. 

In all of his correspondence with the officers of the Delaware, Lack¬ 
awanna & Western Railroad Co. relative to this matter, Judge Arch¬ 
bald used the official stationery of the United States Commerce 
Court, and it is apparent from an examination of the testimony taken 
before this committee that he used his influence as a judge of that 
court to bring about the successful consummation of these negotia¬ 
tions. His persistent activity in said negotiations forces the conclu¬ 
sion that he expected to receive a portion of the fee which the Bolands 
had agreed to pay Watson in the event that a settlement should be 
effected, together with a portion of the large amount demanded by 
Watson, of the Delaware, Lackawanna, & Western Railroad Co. in 
excess of the price which the Bolands were willing to accept for their 
stock in the Marian Coal Co. 

THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEHIGH VALLEY COAL CO. AND THE 

GIRARD ESTATE RELATIVE TO A CULM DUMP KNOWN AS PACKER NO. 3, 

NEAR SHENANDOAH, PA. 

[See Article 3.] 

The Lehigh Valley Coal Co., which is owned by the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad Co., holds a lease on certain coal land located near Shenan¬ 
doah, Pa., and owned by the Girard estate. This lease was made to 
run for a period of 15 years, of which about 13 years have elapsed. 

On August 11, 1911, and at numerous other times thereafter, 
Judge Archbald, by means of correspondence and personal interviews, 
persistently sought to induce, and did induce, the officers of the Le¬ 
high Valley Coal Co. to relinquish the right of that company to oper¬ 
ate a certain culm dump, known as Packer No. 3, containing approxi¬ 
mately 472,670 gross tons, and located on the land leased from the 
Girard estate, provided that a very small royalty should be paid the 
coal company for coal reclaimed from the dump, and provided further 
that the coal should be shipped over the lines of the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad. Judge Archbald thereafter applied to the Girard estate 
for an operating lease on the culm dump known as Packer No. 3, 
stating that he had secured the consent of the Lehigh Valley Coal Co. 


8 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


to operate the property if the Girard estate would approve of the 
arrangement. The judge proposed to pay the Girard estate the same 
royalties on various sizes of coal which were being paid by the Lehigh 
Valley Coal Co. under its lease, which was executed about 13 years 
theretofore, when coal values were materially less than they were, at 
the time Judge Archbald’s proposition was submitted. The trustees 
of the Girard estate promptly declined to grant Judge Archbald the 
lease on the terms proposed, and the deal has never been consumated. 

While these negotiations with the Lehigh Valley Coal Co. were in 
progress the Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. was a party litigant in two 
suits pending before the United States Commerce Court, known as 
The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al. v. The Interstate Commerce 
Commission, No. 38, and The Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. The Inter¬ 
state Commerce Commission, Henry E. Meeker, intervenor, No. 49. 

If Judge Archbald and his associates could have operated this culm 
dump at a profit, the Lehigh Valley Coal Co., by reason of its greater 
facilities for washing and shipping coal, could have operated the prop¬ 
erty at a larger profit, and it is the conclusion of your committee that 
the officers of the coal company relinquished the right to operate the 
said culm dump because of the influence exercised upon them through 
Judge Archbald’s position as a member of the Commerce Court. 

THE LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CASE. 

[See article 4.] 

In February, 1911, upon the organization of the Commerce Court, 
a suit known as The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. The Inter¬ 
state Commerce Commission, which had theretofore been filed in the 
United States Circuit Court at Louisville, Ky., was transferred to the 
United States Commerce Court (Docket No. 4). The case was argued 
on the 2d and 3d of April, 1911, and submitted to the court for adju¬ 
dication. On August 22, 1911, Judge Archbald, who afterwards 
delivered the majority opinion in this case, wrote to Helm Bruce, the 
attorney for the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., at Louisville, Ky., 
requesting him to confer with one Compton, traffic manager of the 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, who had given material testimony 
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and to advise the judge 
whether the witness intended to give an affirmative answer, as appeared 
from the record, or whether he intended to give a negative answer to a 
question propounded to him by the chairman of the commission. In 
pursuance of this request Bruce conferred with Compton and advised 
the judge that the witness intended to give a negative answer to the 
question referred to, which the attorney for the railroad contended 
was shown by the context of the testimony. The receipt of this 
letter was acknowledged by Judge Archbald on August 26, 1911. 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


9 


On January 10, 1912, Judge Archbald again wrote to Bruce, calling 
attention to certain conclusions reached by another member of the 
court, which, it was claimed, refuted statements and contentions ad¬ 
vanced in Bruce’s original brief and sustained the action of the Inter¬ 
state Commerce Commission with respect to certain features of the 
case. In this letter Judge Archbald asked Bruce whether he would still 
affirm the position taken in his brief and, if so, upon what theory it 
could be sustained, assuming that the conclusions of the other member 
of the court were correct. The judge followed this question with a 
number of other questions relative to the features of the case which 
were not then clear to the court. On January 24,1912, Bruce sent the 
judge a letter in answer to the questions which had been propounded 
to him, wherein he argued these special features of the case in behalf 
of the railroad company at considerable length. His letter was clearly 
in the nature of a supplemental brief submitted for the purpose of 
overcoming certain doubts as to the merits of the case of the railroad 
company which apparently had arisen in the minds of some of the 
members of the court. 

On February 28, 1912, this case was decided by the Commerce 
Court in favor of the railroad company. Judge Archbald wrote the 
opinion of the majority, which followed the views expressed by Bruce, 
and Judge Mack dissented. The attorneys for the Interstate Com¬ 
merce Commission and the United States were given no opportunity 
to examine and answer the arguments'advanced by the attorney for 
the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. in his communication to 
Judge Archbald of January 24, 1912, nor were they informed that 
such correspondence had been had. 

In the opinion of your committee, this conduct on the part of Judge 
Archbald was a misbehavior in office, and unfair and unjust to the 
parties defendant in this case. 

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO. 

RELATIVE TO THE LINCOLN CULM DUMP NEAR LORBERRY, PA., 

AND THE WRONGFUL ACCEPTANCE OF A GIFT, REWARD, OR PRESENT 

FROM FREDERIC WARNKE, OF SCRANTON, PA. 

[See Article 5.] 

In 1904 Frederic Warlike, of Scranton, Pa., purchased a two-thirds 
interest in an operating lease on some coal land located near Lorberry 
Junction, Pa., and owned by the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron 
Co. The entire capital stock of the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & 
Iron Co. is owned by the Reading Co., which owns the entire capital 
stock of the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co., a common carrier 
H. Rept. 946,62-2-2 


10 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


engaged in interstate commerce. He put up a number of improve¬ 
ments and operated the culm dump on the property for several years, 
but owing to the action of the elements his operations were carried on 
at a loss. Warnke then applied to the Reading Co. for the mining 
maps of the land covered by his lease. He was informed that the 
lease under which he claimed had been forfeited two years before its 
assignment to him, and his application was therefore denied. He then 
made a proposition to George F. Baer, president of the Philadelphia & 
Reading Railway Co. and president of the Philadelphia & Reading 
Coal & Iron Co., to relinquish any claim that he might have in this 
property under his lease, provided that the Philadelphia & Reading 
Coal & Iron Co. would grant him an operating lease on another prop¬ 
erty owned by said corporation at Lorberry, Pa., and known as the 
Lincoln culm bank. 

Mr. Baer referred Warlike*s proposition to Mr. W. J. Richards, vice 
president and general manager of the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & 
Iron Co., for consideration and action. Richards and Baer thereafter 
concluded that there was no valid reason why they should make an 
exception to the general rule of the coal company not to lease its culm 
banks. Warnke then made several attempts, through attorneys and 
friends, to have this decision reconsidered, and failing in this he asked 
Judge Archbald to intercede in his behalf with Richards. 

In the latter part of November, 1911, Judge Archbald called upon 
Mr. Richards at his office in Pottsville, Pa., in pursuance of an ap¬ 
pointment made by letter, and attempted to influence Richards to 
reconsider his refusal to accede to Warnke’s proposition. Judge 
Archbald was informed, however, that the decision of Richards and 
Baer must be considered final, and the judge so advised Warnke. 

In December, 1911, Warnke was considering the advisability of 
purchasing a certain culm fill located near Pittston, Pa., and owned 
by the Lacoe & Shifter Coal Co. One John Henry Jones, of Scran¬ 
ton, Pa., advised him that Judge Archbald was familiar with the 
title to the property and the rights of way of certain railroads over it. 
In pursuance of this assurance from Jones, Warnke consulted the 
judge, who advised him that the title was clear. Warnke had but 
two conversations with Judge Archbald regarding this matter, not 
exceeding 30 minutes in length altogether, but he at that time stated 
to Judge Archbald that he would pay the judge $500 for the informa¬ 
tion which he had received. Shortly thereafter, Warnke and several 
business associates purchased this property for a consideration of 
$7,500, and in the month of March, 1911, a day or so after Judge 
Archbald had called at the office of Warnke and his associates, 
Warnke drew a promissory note for $500, as president of the coal 
company which had purchased the fill, and caused the same to be 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 11 

delivered to Judge Archbald. The note was discounted in one of the 
banks of Scranton, but has not yet matured. 

Your committee finds that Judge Archbald was guilty of misbe¬ 
havior in office in attempting to use his influence as a member of the 
Commerce Court with the officials of the Philadelphia & Reading 
Coal & Iron Co. and its allied railroad corporation for the purpose 
of aiding Warnke to secure a lease on a certain culm bank owned by 
the coal and iron company, after,the managing officers of said com¬ 
pany had declined to grant the lease. Thereafter Warnke gave 
Judge Archbald $500 in the guise of compensation for legal advice 
rendered, but which, in fact, was in the nature of a reward for favors 
previously shown in connection with the judge’s efforts to bring 
about the acceptance of Warnke’s proposition to the Philadelphia 
& Reading Coal & Iron Co. 

THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEHIGH VALLEY COAL CO. RELATIVE TO 
THE EVERHART TRACT AND THE MORRIS AND ESSEX TRACT. 

[See Article 6.] 

Since 1884 the Lehigh Valley Coal Co., which is a subsidiary of 
the Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., has owned a onQ-half interest in 
a certain tract of coal land located near Wilkes-Barre, Pa., which 
consists of about 800 acres. During the past few years this company 
has purchased about four-fifths of the remaining one-half interest 
in this tract. The remaining portion of the tract is leased by the 
coal company from certain beneficiaries of the Everhart estate. 
The coal company has been negotiating for several years to pur¬ 
chase the fee to this outstanding portion of the tract, but the owners 
would not accept the terms offered. 

In December, 1911, or January, 1912, Judge Archbald entered 
into an agreement with one James R. Dainty, of Scranton, Pa., to 
open negotiations with the Lehigh Valley Coal Co. and the Everhart 
estate for the purpose of effecting the sale of this property to the 
coal company, on the understanding that he and Dainty should 
secure an operating lease on another tract of about 325 acres of coal 
land owned by the Lehigh Valley Coal Co., and known as the Morris 
and Essex tract, as a consideration in the nature of a commission 
for their services. 

In furtherance of this agreement Judge Archbald attempted to 
use his official influence as a member of the Commerce Court, through 
telephone conversations and personal conferences, to affect the action 
of the general manager of the Lehigh Valley Coal Co. with respect 
to the purchase of this property. While these negotiations were 
in progress, the cases of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. The Inter¬ 
state Commerce Commission and Henry E. Meeker, intervenor, No. 


12 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


49, and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al. v. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission, No. 38, in which the Lehigh Valley Rail¬ 
road Co. was a party litigant, were pending before the Commerce 
Court for adjudication. The persistency with which Judge Arch¬ 
bald sought these business favors or property, concessions from 
railroad companies having litigation, or likely to have litigation, 
before the Commerce Court indicates a well-defined plan to use his 
official position and influence as a member of such court for financial 
gain and profit. 

THE DISCOUNT OF THE W. W. RISSINGER NOTE. 

[See Article 7.] 

In the fall of 1908, the case of The Old Plymouth Coal Company v. 
The Equitable Fire & Marine Insurance Company et al., was pending 
before the United States district court over which Judge Archbald 
presided. Mr. W. W. Rissinger, of Scranton, Pa., was the controlling 
stockholder of the plaintiff company. The case was predicated on 
certain insurance contracts between the Old Plymouth Coal Co. and 
the various insurance companies named as parties defendant, and the 
total damages sought to be recovered amounted to about $30,000. 
The case was on trial in November, 1908, and after the plaintiff’s 
evidence had been presented the defendant insurance companies 
demurred to the sufficiency of the evidence and moved for a non¬ 
suit. After extended argument by attorneys for both plaintiff and 
defendant, Judge Archbald overruled the motion and the defendant 
companies proceeded to introduce their evidence. Before the 
evidence was all in the attorneys for the insurance companies made 
a proposition of compromise to the attorneys for the Old Plymouth 
Coal Co., which was accepted on November 23, 1908. Consent 
judgments were entered on that d&y in which the plaintiff ultimately 
recovered about $28,000, and the defendant companies were given 
15 days in which to satisfy the judgments. 

Some time prior to November 28, 1908, Judge Archbald entered 
into a deal with Rissinger for the purchase of an interest in a gold¬ 
mining project in Honduras, which Rissinger was then promoting 
in Scranton. In order to finance the transaction it became neces¬ 
sary to raise $2,500, and on November 28, 1908, or five days after 
the judgments in favor of the Old Plymouth Coal Co. were entered, 
a promissory note for that amount, to run three months, signed by 
Rissinger, in favor of and indorsed by Judge Archbald, and Sophia 
J. Hutchison, Mr. Rissinger’s mother-in-law, was presented to the 
County Savings Bank of Scranton, Pa., for discount. The bank 
evidently put no reliance upon Judge Archbald’s indorsement of 
the note, but made an extended investigation of Mrs. Hutchison’s 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


13 


financial condition, and on December 12, 1908, discounted the note, 
after first filing a judgment against Mrs. Hutchison in the county court 
of Lackawanna County, Pa., according to the practice in that State. 

Shortly after the consent judgments in favor of the Old Plymouth 
Coal Co. were entered on November 23, 1908, this note was also pre¬ 
sented for discount to Mr. John T. Lenalian, one of the attorneys for 
Kissinger and the Old Plymouth Coal Co. in the litigation with the 
insurance companies, but Lenahan refused to discount the note or 
have the same discounted in a trust company of which he was a 
director. The note has never been paid, but has been renewed at the 
expiration of each successiye period of three months by Mr. Kis¬ 
singer, and the discount on the renewals have been paid by him. 

The attempt to discount this note, coming but a few days after the 
Old Plymouth Coal Co. had prevailed in the litigation with the insur¬ 
ance companies tends strongly to indicate that Judge Archbald had 
entered into negotiations with Kissinger while such litigation was 
pending before the United States district court of which he was 
judge. 

But, at all events, the action of Judge Archbald in accepting an 
interest in this enterprise, under the conditions, constituted misbe¬ 
havior in office. 

THE DISCOUNT OF THE JOHN HENRY JONES NOTE. 

[See Articles 8 and 9.] 

In the fall of the year 1909 the case of John W. Peale v. The 
Marian Coal Co., which involved a considerable sum of money, was 
pending before the United States district court at Scranton, Pa., over 
which Judge Archbald presided. The Marian Coal Co. was princi¬ 
pally owned and controlled by Christopher G. Boland and William P. 
Boland, of Scranton, Pa., and this fact was well known to Judge 
Archbald. In the latter part of November or the early part of Decem¬ 
ber, 1909, for the purpose of raising funds to invest in a timber 
project in Venezuela, which was being promoted by one John Henry 
Jones, of Scranton, Pa., Judge Archbald drew and indorsed a prom¬ 
issory note for $500, payable to himself, which note was signed by 
Jones as promisor. 

Judge Archbald thereupon agreed and consented that Edward J. 
Williams should present this note to Christopher G. Boland and 
William P. Boland, or either of them, for discount. In pursuance 
of this agreement or approval of Judge Archbald, Williams did present 
the note to each of the Bolands for the purpose of having the same 
discounted, but they refused to grant the discount, ou the ground 
that it would be highly improper for them to do so under the existing 


14 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


circumstances. Williams reported the refusal of the Bolands to dis¬ 
count the note to Judge Archbald, and thereafter took it to the 
Merchants & Mechanics Bank of Scranton, but this bank also 
refused to discount the paper. 

The note was finally discounted by John Henry Jones in the Provi¬ 
dence Bank, a small State bank located in a suburb of Scranton. The 
president of this bank was bne C. H. Von Storch, of Scranton, Pa., an 
attorney at law, who had prevailed as a party in interest in litigation 
before Judge Archbald’s court within a year prior to the date of the 
discount of the note. The note was brought to Von Storch by Jones at 
the suggestion of Judge Archbald. Moreover, Judge Archbald advised 
Yon Storch that he would consider it a great favor if the discount 
should be granted. The note has never been paid, although the bank 
has made at least one call for payment, and the discount on each 
renewal has been paid by John Henry Jones. 

It is apparent that Judge Archbald’s financial condition at the 
time the incident occurred was such that his note was not considered 
good bankable paper, and your committee is forced to the conclusion 
that he attempted to. use his influence as judge to secure the loan 
from parties litigant before his court, and, failing in this, he did use 
his influence as such judge to secure the loan through an attorney 
who was then practicing before his court, and who had but a short 
while before received favorable judgment in a suit adjudicated 
therein. 

THE WRONGFUL ACCEPTANCE OF MONEY ON THE OCCASION OF A 
PLEASURE TRIP TO EUROPE. 

[See Articles 10 and 11.] 

In the spring of 1910, Judge Archbald allowed one Henry W. 
Cannon, of New York City, to pay his entire expenses on a pleasure 
trip to Europe. Mr. Cannon was then, and still is, a stockholder and 
officer in various interstate railroad corporations, including the 
Great Northern Railroad, the Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co., the 
Fort Wayne, Cincinnati & Louisville Railroad Co.; the Pacific 
Coast Co., which owns the entire stock of the Columbia & Puget 
Sound Railroad Co.; the Pacific Coast Railroad Co.; and the Pacific 
Coast Steamship Co., together with various other corporations 
engaged in the business of mining and shipping coal. 

It is claimed that Mr. Cannon is a distant relative of Judge Arch¬ 
bald’s wife, but, however this may be, your committee regards it 
as improper for a judge to thus obligate himself to an officer of 
numerous corporations likely to become directly or indirectly in- 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


15 


volved in litigation before his court or before other courts over which 
he might be called upon to preside from time to time. 

On the occasion of this same pleasure trip to Europe one Edward 
R. W. Searle, clerk of the United States district court at Scranton, Pa., 
and one J. B. Woodward, of Wilkes-Barre, Pa., jury commissioner 
of said court, both of whom were appointed by Judge Archbald, 
raised a subscription fund of money amounting to more than $500, 
which was presented to Judge Archbald on his departure. This 
fund was not raised as the result of a bar association movement, but 
was composed of contributions of varying amounts from certain 
attorneys practicing before the United States district court, some of 
whom had cases then pending before said court for adjudication. 

Judge Archbald accepted this fund of money and acknowledged 
receipt of the same to the contributors whose names were submitted 
to him at the time that the fund was presented. Your committee 
regards it as improper and subversive of the‘confidence of the public 
in the judiciary for a judge to place himself in this manner under 
obligations to attorneys practicing before his court. 

THE APPOINTMENT OF A RAILROAD ATTORNEY AS JURY COMMISSIONER. 

[See Article 12.] 

On March 29, 1901, Judge Archbald was appointed United States 
district judge for the middle district of Pennsylvania. On April 9, 
1901, under the exercise of authority granted by the act of June 30, 
1879 (21 Stat. 43), Judge Archbald appointed one J. B. Woodward, 
of Wilkes-Barre, Pa., as jury commissioner of the said district court. 
The said Woodward was then and has since been a general attorney 
for the Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. 

Under the annual appropriation acts, the compensation of jury 
commissioners is limited to $5 per day, for not more than three days 
at any one term of court. It is apparent that the compensation 
attached to this position is so insignificant that the appointment 
would have no attraction for a railroad attorney except for the power 
it affords in the selection of juries for the trial of cases in the Federal 
courts. 

Judge Archbald’s action in appointing to this position the legal 
representative of a large railroad corporation, which was likely to 
become directly or indirectly involved in litigation before the United 
States district court, was misbehavior in office, calculated to bring 
the Federal judiciary into disrepute. 


16 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


GENERAL MISBEHAVIOR OF JUDGE ARCHBALD. 

(See article 13.) 

The testimony in the whole case tends to support this general 
specification. Judge Archbald was appointed a United States 
district judge for the middle district of Pennsylvania on the 29th 
day of March, 1901, and held such office until January 31, 1911, 
on which last-named date he was appointed an additional United 
States circuit judge and on the same day was duly designated as 
one of the judges of the United States Commerce Court, which 
position he has since held and now holds. 

The testimony shows that at different times while Judge Archbald 
was a judge of the United States district court he sought and 
obtained credit and in other instances sought to obtain credit from 
persons who had litigation pending in his said court or who had 
had litigation pending in his said court. 

The testimony shows that after Judge Archbald had been pro¬ 
moted to the position of a United States circuit judge and had 
been duly designated as one of the judges of the United States 
Commerce Court, he in connection with different persons sought 
to obtain options on culm dumps and other coal properties from 
officers and agents of coal companies which were owned and con¬ 
trolled by railroad companies. 

The testimony further shows that in order to influence the officers 
of the coal companies which were subsidiary to and owned by the 
railroad companies, Judge Archbald repeatedly sought to influence 
the officials of the railroads to enter into contracts with his associates 
for the financial benefit of himself and his said associates. In most 
instances the contracts were executed in the name of the person asso¬ 
ciated with the judge in the particular transaction or trade, and the 
judge’s name was not disclosed on the face of the contract. The testi¬ 
mony shows, however, that he was, as a matter of fact, pecuniarily 
interested in such contracts and that while his interest was not known 
to the public it was known to the officials of the railroad companies 
and of the coal companies, subsidiary corporations thereof. 
The evidence discloses that while the judge’s several associates 
or partners would locate properties, the judge would take up 
the matter of the purchase or sale of said properties with the 
officials of the coal companies and of the railroad companies which, 
as already stated, in most instances owned and controlled the coal 
companies. The testimony shows that while these negotiations were 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


17 


being conducted, and agreements were made and sought to be made, 
the railroad companies with whose officers Judge Archbald was 
making contracts and agreements and seeking to make contracts and 
agreements were common carriers engaged in interstate commerce 
and had litigation pending in the United States Commerce Court. 

The testimony shows that such options, contracts, and agree¬ 
ments were sought and obtained and sought to be obtained by 
Judge Archbald to such an extent that the exposure of the judge’s 
several transactions through the press gave rise to a public scandal. 

The testimony fails to disclose any case in which Judge Archbald 
invested any actual money of his own in any of these several trades 
or deals, but shows that he used his personal influence as a judge, 
in consideration of which he received or was to receive his share or 
interest in the property or his profits in the deal. 

Your committee finds that Judge Archbald by his conduct in carry¬ 
ing on traffic in culm dumps and coal properties owned directly or 
indirectly by railroads, and in using his influence to secure such 
contracts from coal companies which were owned and controlled 
by railroad companies as aforesaid, and in using his influence with 
high officials of said railroads to induce them to permit or direct 
the said coal companies to enter into contracts with him or his 
associates which resulted in financial profit to himself and those 
associated with him, grossly abused the proprieties of his said office 
of judge, was guilty of misbehavior and of a misdemeanor in office. 

The Law. 

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENTS. 

The provisions of the Constitution of the United States bearing 
upon the impeachment of judges are as follows: 

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers, and 
shall have the sole power of impeachment. (Art. I, sec. 2.) 

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under 
the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject 
to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law. (Art. I, sec. 3.) 

The President * * * shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for 
offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. (Art. II, sec. 2.) 

The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be 
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors. (Art. II, sec. 4.) 

The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and 
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during 
good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, 
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. (Art. Ill, sec. 1.) 

The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury. (Art. Ill, 
sec. 2.) 

H. Kept. 946, 62-J 


-3 


18 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


THE GENERAL NATURE OF IMPEACHMENTS. 

The fundamental law of impeachment was stated by Richard 
Wooddesson, an eminent authority, in his Law Lectures delivered 
at Oxford in 1777, as follows (vol. 2, pp. 355, 358): 

It is certain that magistrates and officers intrusted with the administration of pub¬ 
lic affairs may abuse their delegated powers to the extensive detriment of the com¬ 
munity and at the same time in a manner not properly cognizable before the ordinary 
tribunals. The influence of such delinquents and the nature of such offenses may 
not unsuitably engage the authority of the highest court and the wisdom of the sagest 
assembly. The Commons, therefore, as the grand inquest of the nation, became 
suitors for penal justice, and they can not consistently, either with their own dignity 
or with safety to the accused, sue elsewhere but to those who share with them in the 
legislature. 

On this policy is founded the origin of impeachments, which began soon after the 
constitution assumed its present form (p. 355). 

******* 

Such kind of misdeeds, however, as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the 
abuse of high offices of trust, are most proper—and have been the most usual 
grounds—for this kind of prosecution (p. 358). 

Referring to the function of impeachments, Rawle, in his work 
on the Constitution (p. 211), says: 

The delegation of important trusts affecting the higher interests of society, is alway 
from various causes liable to abuse. The fondness frequently felt for the inordi¬ 
nate extension of power, the influence of party and of prejudice, the seductions of 
foreign states, or the baser appetite for illegitimate emoluments, are sometimes pro¬ 
ductions of what are not unaptly termed “political offences” (Federalist, No. 65), 
which it would be difficult to take cognizance of in the ordinary course of judicial 
proceeding. 

The involutions and varieties of vice are too many and too artful to be anticipated 
by positive law. 

In Story on the Constitution (vol. 1, 5th ed., p. 584) the parlia¬ 
mentary history of impeachments is briefly stated as follows: 

800. In examining the parliamentary history of impeachments, it will be found 
that many offenses, not easily definable by law, and many of a purely political charac¬ 
ter, have been deemed high crimes and misdemeanors worthy of this extraordinary 
remedy. Thus, lord chancellors and judges and other magistrates have not only been 
impeached for bribery, and acting grossly contrary to the duties of their office, but for 
misleading their sovereign by unconstitutional opinions, and for attempts to subvert 
the fundamental laws, and introduce arbitrary power. So where a lord chancellor 
has been thought to have put the great seal to an ignominious treaty, a lord admiral to 
have neglected the safeguard of the sea, an ambassador to have betrayed his trust, a 
privy councilor to have propounded or supported pernicious and dishonorable measures, 
or a confidential adviser of his sovereign to have obtained exorbitant grants or incom¬ 
patible employments—these have been all deemed impeachable offenses. Some of 
the offenses, indeed, for which persons were impeached in the early ages of British 
jurisprudence, would now seem harsh and severe; but perhaps they were rendered 
necessary by existing corruptions, and the importance of suppressing a spirit of favorit¬ 
ism and court intrigue. Thus persons have been impeached for giving bad counsel 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


19 


to the King, advising a prejudicial peace, enticing the King to act against the advice of 
Parliament, purchasing offices, giving medicine to the King without advice of physi¬ 
cians, preventing other persons from giving counsel to the King except in their pres¬ 
ence, and procuring exorbitant personal grants from the King. But others, again, 
were founded in the most salutary public justice, such as impeachments for malversa¬ 
tions and neglects in office, for encouraging pirates, for official oppression, extortions, 
and deceits, and especially for putting good magistrates out of office and advancing bad. 
One can not but be struck, in this slight enumeration, with the utter unfitness of the 
common tribunals of justice to take cognizance of such offenses, and with the entire 
propriety of confiding the jurisdiction over them to a tribunal capable of understanding 
and reforming and scrutinizing the polity of the state, and of sufficient dignity to main¬ 
tain the independence and reputation of worthy public officers. 

IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. 

The provision in Article II, section 4, of the Constitution of the 
United States defining impeachable offenses as “treason, bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors ” was taken from the British 
parliamentary law, established and prevailing at the time of the for¬ 
mation of our Government. It must, therefore, be interpreted by 
the light of time-honored parliamentary usage, as contradistinguished 
from the common municipal law of England. 

Our fathers, mindful of the flagrant persecution of the subjects of 
England in the guise of prosecutions for treason against the Crown, 
specifically defined the elements of the offense of treason against the 
United States in Article III, section 3, of our organic law. 

The offense of bribery had a fixed status in the parliamentary law 
as well as the criminal law of England when our Constitution was 
adopted, and there is little difficulty in determining its nature and- 
extent in the application of the law of impeachments in this country. 

In addition to the specific offenses of treason and bribery, all of¬ 
fenses falling within the classification of “high crimes and misdemean¬ 
ors,” which were subjects of impeachment by the British Parliament, 
were made impeachable offenses under the Constitution of the United 
States, subject to the limitations prescribed by that instrument. 

In a footnote to 4 Blackstone (p. 5, Lewis’s Ed.) Christian says: 

The word “crime” has no technical meaning in the law of England. It seems, 
when it has a reference to positive law, to comprehend those acts which subject the 
offender to punishment. When the words “high crimes and misdemeanors” are 
used in prosecutions by impeachment, the words “high crimes” have no definite 
signification, but are used merely to give greater solemnity to the charge. 

The term “misdemeanor” has a twofold legal significance. Under 
the common law it signifies a criminal offense, not amounting to 
felony, which is punishable by indictment or other special criminal 
proceeding. As applied to civil officers, in the sense of the lex par¬ 
liamentary, it signifies maladministration or misbehavior in office, 
irrespective of whether such conduct is or is not indictable. 


20 


EOBEET W. AECHBALD. 


It is well established by the authorities that impeachable offenses 
under the British constitution and under our Constitution are not 
limited to statutable crimes and misdemeanors, or to offenses indict¬ 
able under the common law and triable in the courts of ordinary 
jurisdiction. 

In his commentaries on the Constitution, John Kandolph Tucker 
defines impeachable offenses as follows (vol. 1, sec. 200): 

What are impeachable offenses? 

(a) Treason. This is defined by the Constitution. 

(b) Bribery , which needs no special comment. For its definition resort may be had 
to its meaning in Criminal Procedure. 

(c) High crimes and misdemeanors. What is the meaning of these terms? Much 
controversy has arisen out of this question. Do these words refer only to offenses for 
which the party may be indicted under the authority of the United States? Do they 
mean offenses by the common law? Do they include offenses against the laws of the 
States, or do they mean offenses for which there is no indictment in the ordinary 
courts of justice? Or do they include mal-administration, unconstitutional action 
of an officer willful or mistaken, or illegal action willful or mistaken? 

(d) Up to September 8, 1787, the clause in reference to the impeachable offenses 
only included treason and bribery. On that day Mr. Mason moved to add the words 
“or mal-administration. ” Mr. Madison objected to the vagueness of this term, where¬ 
upon Mr. Mason withdrew the word “mal-administration,” and substituted “other 
high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States,” and the clause was then 
agreed to by a vote of ten States to one. As the word “other” is inserted before the 
words “high crimes and misdemeanors,” these last words may be interpreted by 
the nature of the crimes “treason and bribery. ” Why should an ufficer be impeached 
for treason? Obviously, because an officer guilty of treason against the United States 
would be disqualified personally from being an officer of a government to which he 
was a traitor. How could a President properly command an army of the United 
States when he was engaged in levying war against them, or adhering to their enemies? 
The utter inconsistency of this double position made it a proper offense for the juris¬ 
diction of impeachment. The same objection would apply to any other officer of 
the United States. To be employed in the service of the United States, against which 
he was levying war, or adhering to their enemies, was a total personal disqualification. 

(e) So in respect to bribery. Bribery corrupts public duty. The difference 
between treason and bribery is that the first is a crime defined by the Constitution, 
as to which Congress has no power except to declare its punishment. Bribery is not 
a constitutional crime, and was not made a crime against the United States by statute 
until April, 1790. These two cases, therefore, show that the words “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” can not be confined to crimes created and defined by a statute of the 
United States; for if Congress had ever failed to have fixed a punishment for the con¬ 
stitutional crime of treason, or had failed to pass an act in reference to the crime of 
bribery, as it did fail for more than a year after the Constitution went into opera¬ 
tion, it would result that no officer would be impeachable for either crime, because 
Congress had failed to pass the needful statutes defining crime in the case of bribery, 
and prescribing the punishment in the case of treason as well as bribery. It can 
hardly be supposed that the Constitution intended to make impeachment for these 
two flagrant crimes depend upon the action of Congress. The conclusion from this 
would seem to be inevitable, that treason and bribery, and other high crimes and mis- 



ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 21 

demeanors, in respect to which Congress had failed to legislate, would still be within 
the jurisdiction of the process of impeachment. 

(/) The word “maladministration,” which Mr. Mason originally proposed, and 
which he displaced because of its vagueness for the words “other high crimes and 
misdemeanors,” was intended to embrace all official delinquency or maladministra¬ 
tion by an officer of the Government where it was criminal; that is, where the act done 
was done with willful purpose to violate public duty. There can be no crime in an 
act where it is done through inadvertence or mistake, or from misjudgment. Where 
it is a willful and purposed violation of duty it is criminal. 

( g ) This construction is aided by the fact that judges hold their offices during “good 
behavior.” These words do not mean that a judge shall decide rightly, but that he 
shall decide conscientiously. He is not amenable to impeachment for a wrong deci¬ 
sion, else when an inferior judge is reversed he would be impeachable; or, in the 
Supreme Court, a dissenting judge might be held impeachable because a large majority 
of the court affirmed the law to be otherwise. But if he decides unconscientiously— 
if he decides contrary to his honest conviction from corrupt partiality—this can not 
be good behavior, and he is impeachable. Again, if the judge is drunken on the 
bench, this is ill behavior, for which he is impeachable. And all of these are generally 
criminal, or misdemeanor—for misdemeanor is a synonym for misbehavior. So, if he 
omits a judicial duty, as well as when he commits a violation of duty, he is guilty of 
crime or misdemeanor; for, says Blackstone, “crime or misdemeanor is an act com¬ 
mitted or omitted in violation of a public law either forbidding or commanding it.” 

To confine the impeachable offenses to those which are made crimes or misde¬ 
meanors by statute or other specific law would too much constrict the jurisdiction to 
meet the obvious purpose of the Constitution, which was, by impeachment, to deprive 
of office those who by any act of omission or commission showed clear and flagrant dis¬ 
qualification to hold it. On the other hand, to hold that all departures from, or 
failures in, duty, which were not willful, but due to mistake, inadvertence, or mis¬ 
judgment, and to let in all offenses at common law, which, by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court, are not within Federal authority at all, would be to extend the juris¬ 
diction by impeachment far beyond what was obviously the purpose and design of its 
creation. It must be criminal misbehavior—a purposed defiance of official duty—to 
disqualify the man from holding office—or disable him from ever after holding office, 
which constitute the penalty upon conviction under the impeachment process. The 
punishment, upon conviction, indicates the character of the crime or misdemeanor for 
which impeachment is constitutional. If the crime or misdemeanor for which the 
impeachment is made be not such as to justify the punishment inflicted, we may well 
conclude it was within the purpose of the Constitution in using the impeachment 
procedure. 

In Cooley’s Principles of Constitutional Law it is said (p. 178): 

The offenses for which the President or any other officer may be impeached are any 
such as in the opinion of the House are deserving of punishment under that process. 
They are not necessarily offenses against the general laws. In the history of England 
where the like proceeding obtains, the offenses have often been political, and in some 
cases for gross betrayal of public interests punishment has very justly been inflicted on 
cabinet officers. It is often found that offenses of a very serious nature by high officers 
are not offenses against the criminal code, but consist in abuses or betrayals of trust, 
or inexcusable neglects of duty, which are dangerous and criminal because of the 
immense interests involved, and the greatness of the trust which has not been kept. 
Such cases must be left to be dealt with on their own facts, and judged according to 
their apparent deserts (p. 178). 


22 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


In his work on the Constitutional History of the United States, 
George Ticknor Curtis says (vol. 1, pp. 481-482): 

Among the separate functions assigned by the Constitution to the Houses of Con¬ 
gress are those of presenting and trying impeachments. An impeachment, in the 
report of the committee of detail, was treated as an ordinary judicial proceeding 
and was placed within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That this was not in 
all respect' a suitable provision will appear from the following considerations: 
Although an impeachment may involve an inquiry whether a crime against any 
positive law has been committed, yet it is not necessarily a trial for crime, nor is 
there any necessity, in the case of crimes committed by public officers, for the insti¬ 
tution of any special proceeding for the infliction of the punishment prescribed by 
the laws, since they, like all other persons, are amenable to the ordinary jurisdic¬ 
tion of the courts of justice in respect of offenses against positive law. The purposes 
of an impeachment lie wholly beyond the penalties of the statute or the customary 
law. The object of the proceeding is to ascertain whether cause exists for removing 
a public officer from office. Such a cause may be found in the fact that either in 
the discharge of his office or aside from its functions he has violated a law or com¬ 
mitted what is technically denominated a crime. But a cause for removal from office 
may exist where no offense against positive law has been committed, as where the 
individual has, from immorality or imbecility or maladministration, become unfit 
to exercise the office. The rules by which an impeachment is to be determined 
are therefore peculiar and are not fully embraced by those principles or provisions 
of law which courts of ordinary jurisdiction are required to administer. (Yol. 1, 
pp. 481-482.) 

In Watson on the Constitution (vol. 2, p. 1034, published in 1910) 
it is said: 

A misdemeanor comprehends all indictable offenses which do not amount to a 
felony, as perjury, battery, libels, conspiracies, attempts and solicitations to commit 
felonies, etc. These seem to be the definitions of these terms at common law, but it 
would be strange if a civil officer could be impeached for only such offenses as are 
embraced within the common-law definition of “other high crimes and misdemeanors.” 
There is a parliamentary definition of the term “misdemeanor,” and a modern writer 
on the Constitution has said: “The term ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’ has no 
significance in the common law concerning crimes subject to indictment. It can only 
be found in the law of Parliament and is the technical term which was used by the 
Commons at the Bar of the Lords for centuries before the existence of the United 
States.” Synonymous with the term “misdemeanor” are the terms misdeed, miscon¬ 
duct, misbehavior, fault, transgression. 

In Story on the Constitution (5th ed., vol. 1, secs. 796, 799) it is 
said: 

Is the silence of the statute book to be deemed conclusive in favor of the party until 
Congress have made a legislative declaration and enumeration of the offenses which 
shall be deemed high crimes and misdemeanors? If so, then, as has been truly 
remarked, the power of impeachment, except as to the two expressed cases, is a com¬ 
plete nullity, and the party is wholly dispunishable however enormous may be his 
corruption and criminality. (Sec. 796.) 

Congress has unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion that no previous statute is 
necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official misconduct; and the rules of 
proceeding, and the rules of evidence, as well as the principles of decision, have been 


ROBERT W. AKCHBALD. 


23 


uniformly regulated by the known doctrines of the common law and parliamentary 
usage. In the few cases of impeachment which have hitherto been tried, no one of 
the charges has rested upon any statutable misdemeanors. (Sec. 799.) 

Foster, in his work on the Constitution (sec. 93), says: 

The term “high crimes and misdemeanors” has no significance in the common law 
concerning crimes subject to indictment. It can be found only in the law of Parlia¬ 
ment and is the technical term which has been used by the Commons at the bar of the 
Lords for centuries before the existence of the United States. 

******* 

Impeachable offenses are those which were the subject of impeachment by the prac¬ 
tice in Parliament before the Declaration of Independence, except in so far as that 
practice is repugnant to the language of the Constitution and the spirit of American 
institutions. An examination of the English precedents will show that, although 
private citizens as well as public officers have been impeached, no article has been 
presented or sustained which did not charge either misconduct in office or some offense 
which was injurious to the welfare of the State at large. 

In this class of cases, which rest so much in the discretion of the Senate, the writer 
would be rash who were to attempt to prescribe the limits of its jurisdiction in this 
respect. 

An impeachable offense may consist of treason, bribery, or a breach of official duty 
by malfeasance or misfeasance, including conduct such as drunkenness, when habitual 
or in the performance of official duties, gross indecency, and profanity, obscenity, or 
other language, used in the discharge of an official function, which tends to bring the 
office into disrepute, or an abuse or reckless exercise of a discretionary power, as well 
as a breach or omission of an official duty imposed by statute or common law; or a pub¬ 
lic speech when off duty which encourages insurrection. It does not consist in an 
error in judgment made in good faith in the decision of a doubtful question of law, 
except perhaps in the case of a violation of the Constitution. 

In the American and English Enclycopedia of Law, second edition 
(vol. 15, pp. 1066-1068), it is said: 

The Constitution of the United States provides that the President, Vice President, 
and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeach_ 
ment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemean¬ 
ors. If impeachment in England be regarded merely as a mode of trial for the 
punishment of common-law or statutory crimes, and if the Constitution has adopted 
it only as a mode of procedure, leaving the crimes to which it is to be applied to be 
settled by the general rules of criminal law, then, as it is well settled that in regard 
to the National Government there are no common-law crimes, it would seem nec¬ 
essarily to follow that impeachment can be instituted only for crimes specifically 
named in the Constitution or for offenses declared to be crimes by Federal statute. 
This view has been maintained by very eminent authority, but the cases of im¬ 
peachment that have been brought under the Constitution would seem to give to 
the remedy a much wider scope than the above rule would indicate. In each of 
the only two cases of impeachment tried by the Senate in which a conviction 
resulted the defendant was found guilty of offenses not indictable either at common 
law or under any Federal statute, and in almost every case brought offenses were 
charged in the articles of impeachment which were not indictable under any Federal 
statute and in several cases they were such as constituted neither a statutory nor a 
common-law crime. The impeachability of the offenses charged in the articles was 
in most of the cases not denied. In one case, however, counsel for the defendant 


24 


ROBERT W. AKCHBALD. 


insisted that impeachnient would not lie for any but an indictable offense; but 
after exhaustive argument on both sides this defense was practically abandoned. 
The cases, then, seem to establish that impeachment is not a mere mode of pro¬ 
cedure for the punishment of indictable crimes; that the phrase “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” is to be taken not in its common-law but in its broader parliamentary 
sense, and is to be interpreted in the light of parliamentary usage; that in this sense it 
includes not only crimes for which an indictment may be brought, but grave politi¬ 
cal offenses, corruption, maladministration, or neglect of duty involving moral 
turpitude, arbitrary and oppressive conduct, and even gross improprieties, by 
judges and high officers of State, although such offenses be not of a character to 
render the offender liable to an indictment either at common law or under any 
statute. Additional weight is added to this interpretation of the Constitution by 
the opinions of eminent writers on constitutional and parliamentary law and by 
the fact that some of the most distinguished members of the convention that framed 
it have thus interpreted it. 

It will thus be seen that the common law of crimes and the parlia¬ 
mentary law of impeachments have no direct connection, although 
the principles of the one may be invoked in the application of the 
other. They represent two distinct branches in our scheme of 
jurisprudence and they should be so treated in the consideration of 
the case which is here presented. 

THE TENURE OF FEDERAL JUDGES LIMITED TO “ DURING GOOD 
BEHAVIOR.” 

The provision in Article III, section 1, of our Constitution that 
“the judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold 
their offices during good behavior,” which was also borrowed from 
the English laws, should be considered in pari materia with Article 
IV, section 2, providing that all civil officers of the United States 
shall be removed from office upon “impeachment for and conviction 
of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” 

Good behavior is thus made the essential condition on which the 
tenure to the judicial office rests, and any act committed or omitted 
by the incumbent in violation of this condition necessarily works a 
forfeiture of the office. The Constitution provides no method 
whereby a civil officer of the United States can be removed from 
office save by impeachment. It follows, therefore, that the framers 
of our Constitution must have intended that Federal judges, who 
are civil officers, should be removable from office by impeachment 
for misbehavior, which is the antithesis of good behavior. Otherwise 
the constitutional provision limiting the tenure of the judicial office 
to “during good behavior” would be without force and effect. 

In his work on the Constitution, Foster says (p. 586): 

The Constitution provides that— 

“The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during 
good behavior.” 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


25 


This necessarily implies that they may be removed in case of bad behavior. But 
no means except impeachment is provided for their removal, and judicial misconduct 
is not indictable by either a statute of the United States or the common law. 

In Watson on the Constitution, the proposition is stated as follows 
(vol. 2, pp. 1036-1037): 

A civil officer may so behave in public as to bring disgrace upon himself and shame 
upon his country, and he may continue to do this until his name would become a 
national stench, and yet he would not be subject to indictment by any law of the 
United States, but he certainly could be impeached. What will those who advocate 
the doctrine that impeachment will not lie except for an offense punishable by statute 
do with the constitutional provision relative to judges which says, “Judges, both of 
the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior ” ? This 
means that as long as they behave themselves their tenure of office is fixed, and they 
can not be disturbed. But suppose, they cease to behave themselves? When the 
Constitution says, “A judge shall hold his office during good behavior,” it means that 
he shall not hold it when it ceases to be good. Suppose he should refuse to sit upon 
the bench and discharge the duties which the Constitution and the law enjoin upon 
him, or should become a notoriously corrupt character, and live a notoriously corrupt 
and debauched life? He could not be indicted for such conduct, and he could not be 
removed except by impeachment. Would it be claimed that impeachment would 
not be the proper remedy in such a case? 

IMPEACHMENTS NOT CONFINED TO OFFENSES COMMITTED IN AN OFFI¬ 
CIAL CAPACITY. 

It is not essential that an offense should be committed in an official 
capacity in order that it may come within the purview of the con¬ 
stitutional provisions relating to impeachments. 

Black, in his work on Constitutional Law, says (2d ed., pp. 121-122): 

Treason and bribery are well-defined crimes. But the phrase “other high crimes 
and misdemeanors” is so very indefinite that practically it is not susceptible of exact 
definition or limitation, but the power of impeachment may be brought to bear on 
any offense against the Constitution or the laws which, in the judgment of the House, 
is deserving of punishment by this means or is of such a character as to render the party 
accused unfit to hold and exercise his office. It is, of course, primarily directed against 
official misconduct. Any gross malversation in office, whether or not it is a pun¬ 
ishable offense at law, may be made the ground of an impeachment. But the power 
of impeachment is not restricted to political crimes alone. The Constitution provides 
that the party convicted upon impeachment shall still remain liable to trial and 
punishment according to law. From this it is to be inferred that the commission of 
any crime which is of a grave nature, though it may have nothing to do with the per¬ 
son’s official position, except that it shows a character or motives inconsistent with 
the due administration of his office, would render him liable to impeachment. It 
will be perceived that the power to determine what crimes are impeachable rests very 
much with Congress. For the House, before preferring articles of impeachment, will 
decide whether the acts or conduct complained of constitute a “high crime or mis¬ 
demeanor.” And the Senate, in trying the case, will also have to consider the same 
question. If, in the judgment of the Senate, the offense charged is not impeachable, 
they will acquit; otherwise, upon sufficient proof and the concurrence of the neces- 
say majority, they will convict. And in either case, there is no other power which 
can review or reverse their decision. 

H. Kept, 946, 62-2-4 



26 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


In 1862 West H. Humphreys, United States district judge for the 
district of Tennessee, was impeached on several specifications, one of 
which was based on his action in making a speech at a public meeting, 
while off the bench, inciting revolt and rebellion against the Consti¬ 
tution and Government of the United States. The evidence clearly 
showed that he was in nowise acting in a judicial capacity, yet he 
was convicted on this charge. 

A number of the impeachments of judges of the several States of the 
Union have been predicated on various acts of debauchery entirely 
separate from the performance of their official duties. 

Any conduct on the part of a judge which reflects on his integrity 
as a man or his fitness to perform the judicial functions should be 
sufficient to sustain his impeachment. It would be both absurd and 
monstrous to hold that an impeachable offense must needs be com¬ 
mitted in an official capacity. If such an atrocious doctrine should 
receive the sanction of the Congressional authority there is no limit 
to the variety and the viciousness of the offenses which a Federal judge 
might commit with perfect immunity from effective impeachment. 

IMPEACHMENT FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED IN ANOTHER JUDICIAL 

OFFICE. 

Certain of the proposed articles of impeachment against Judge 
Archbald are based on offenses committed while he held the office 
of United States district judge for the middle district of Pennsylvania, 
whereas he now holds the office of circuit judge of the United States 
for the third judicial circuit, and is assigned to serve for a period of 
four years in the Commerce Court. In this respect the case here 
presented seems to be unique in the annals of impeachment pro¬ 
ceedings under our Constitution. 

By virtue of the provisions of section 609 of the Revised Statutes, 
which were then in force, Judge Archbald, while holding the office of 
United States district judge, was duly clothed with authority to sit 
or preside in the United States circuit court, and he was actually pre¬ 
siding over such circuit court at Scranton, Pa., during the time that 
some or all of the offenses charged in these articles were committed. 

Since his elevation to a circuit judgeship the United States circuit 
courts have been abolished by the act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat., 
1087), entitled “An act to codify, revise, and amend the laws relating 
to the judiciary,” but the provisions relative to the interchangeability 
of district and circuit judges remain substantially the same. Section 
18 of this act provides that— 

Whenever, in the judgment of the senior circuit judge of the circuit in which the 
district lies, or of the circuit justice assigned to such circuit, or of the Chief Justice, 
the public interest shall require, the said judge or Associate Justice or Chief Justice 
shall designate and appoint any circuit judge of the circuit to hold said district court. 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD, 


27 


Thus it appears that Judge Arclibald now holds a civil office, within 
the meaning of the Constitution, of the same judicial nature as the 
office held by him at the time of the commission of the offenses 
charged in the said articles, and that, under the existing law, he may 
be called upon at any time to perform precisely the same functions 
that he performed as United States district judge. 

In State v. Hill (37 Nebr., 80) the Legislature of Nebraska had 
impeached certain ex-officers of the State for offenses alleged to have 
been committed during their respective terms of office. The Supreme 
Court of Nebraska held that inasmuch as they had ceased to be civil 
officers of the State they were not subject to impeachment. In the 
course of the decision the court said (pp. 88-89): 

Judge Barnard was impeached in the State of New York during his second term for 
acts committed in his previous term of office. His plea that he was not liable to 
impeachment for offenses occurring in the first term was overruled. Precisely the 
same question was raised in the impeachment proceedings against Judge Hubbel, of 
Wisconsin, and on the trial of Gov. Butler, of this State, and in each of which the 
ruling was the same as in the Barnard case. There was good reason for overruling the 
plea to the jurisdiction in the three cases just mentioned. Each respondent was a 
civil officer at the time he was impeached and had been such uninterruptedly since 
the alleged misdemeanors in office were committed. The fact that the offense occurred 
in the previous term was immaterial. The object of impeachment is to remove a 
corrupt or unworthy officer. If his term has expired and he is no longer in office, that 
object is attained and the reason for his impeachment no longer exists. But if the 
offender is still an officer, he is amenable to impeachment, although the acts charged 
were committed in his previous term of the same office. 

In the cases discussed there was a constructive breach in the tenure 
of the offices held by the defendants between the time of the com¬ 
mission of the offenses charged and the adoption of the articles of 
impeachment. Even though the offices held by the defendants at the 
time of their impeachment had not been the same offices which they 
held at the time of the commission of the alleged offenses, it might 
well have been decided, on principle, that impeachment would lie 
if in fact the prescribed functions of such offices were of the same 
general nature and susceptible to the same malversations and abuse. 

It is indeed anomalous if this Congress is powerless to remove a 
corrupt or unfit Federal judge from office because his corruption or 
misdemeanor, however vicious or reprehensible, may have occurred 
during his tenure .in some other judicial office under the Government 
of the United States prior to his appointment to the particular office 
from which he is sought to be ousted by impeachment, although he 
may have held a Federal judgeship continuously from the time of the 
commission of his offenses. Surely the House of Representatives 
will not recognize nor the Senate apply such a narrow and technical 
construction of the constitutional provisions relating to impeach¬ 
ments. 


28 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


Conclusion. 

Judges “ shall hold their offices during good behavior.” Thus says 
the Constitution. The framers of that instrument were desirous of 
having an independent and incorruptible judiciary, but they never 
intended to provide that any judge should hold his office upon nonfor¬ 
feitable life tenure. Those who formulated the organic law sought 
to protect the people against the malfeasance and misfeasance of 
unjust and* corrupt judges. Therefore, they wisely limited the 
tenure of office to “ during good behavior ” and provided the remedy 
for misbehavior to be forfeiture of office and the removal therefrom 
by impeachment. 

The conduct of this judge has been exceedingly reprehensible and 
in marked contrast with the high sense of judicial ethics and probity 
that generally characterize the Federal judiciary. Be it said to the 
credit of the wisdom of our fathers and in behalf of our American insti¬ 
tutions that the judges have, as a rule, deported themselves in such 
manner as to merit and keep the confidence of the people. The pub¬ 
lic respect for the judicial branch of our Government has almost 
amounted to reverence. This confidence has been deserved and let 
us hope that it will continue to be deserved to the end that an upright 
and independent judiciary may be maintained for the perpetuation 
of our government of law. 

A judge should be the personification of integrity, of honor and of 
uprightness in his daily walk and conversation. He should hold his 
exalted office and the administration of justice above the sordid 
desire to accumulate wealth by trading or trafficking with actual or 
probable litigants in his court. He should be free and unaffected by 
any bias born of avarice and unhampered by pecuniary or other 
improper obligations. • 

Your committee is of opinion that Judge Archbald’s sense of moral 
responsibility has become deadened. He has prostituted his high 
office for personal profit. He has attempted by various transactions 
to commercialize his potentiality as judge. He has shown an over¬ 
weening desire to make gainful bargains with parties having cases 
before him or likely to have cases before him. To accomplish this 
purpose he has not hesitated to use his official power and influence. 
He has degraded his high office and has destroyed the confidence of 
the public in his judicial integrity. He has forfeited the condition 
upon which he holds his commission and should be removed from 
office by impeachment. 

Recommendation. 

Your committee reports herewith the accompanying resolution and 
articles of impeachment against Judge Robert W. Archbald, and 
recommends that they be adopted by the House and that they be 
presented to the Senate with a demand for the conviction and removal 
from office of said Robert W. Archbald, United States circuit judge 
designated as a member of the Commerce Court: 


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RESOLUTION. 

Resolved, That Robert W. Archbald, additional circuit 
judge of the United States from the third judicial circuit, 
appointed pursuant to the act of June 18, 1910 (U. S. Stat. 
L., vol. 36, 540), and having duly qualified and having 
been duly commissioned and designated on the 31st day of 
January, 1911, to serve for four years in the Commerce 
Court, be impeached for misbehavior and for high crimes 
and misdemeanors; and that the evidence heretofore taken 
by the Committee on the Judiciary under House resolution 
524 sustains 13 articles of impeachment which are 
hereinafter set out; and that said articles be, and they are 
hereby, adopted by the House of Representatives, and that 
the same shall be exhibited to the Senate in the following 
words and figures, to wit: 

ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT 
Of the House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in the name of themselves 
and of all of the people of the United States of America 
against Robert W. Archbald, additional circuit fudge 
of the United States from the third judicial circuit, 

29 


30 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


1 appointed pursuant to the act of June 18, 1910 (U. S. 

2 Stat. L., vol. 36, 540), and having duly qualified and 

3 having been duly commissioned and designated on the 

4 31st day of January, 1911, to serve for four years 

5 in the Commerce Court: 

6 ARTICLE 1. 

7 That the said Robert W. Archbald, at Scranton, in the 

8 State of Pennsylvania, being a United States circuit judge, 

9 and having been duly designated as one of the judges of 

10 the United States Commerce Court, and being then and 

11 there a judge of the said court, on March 31, 1911, en- 

12 tered into an agreement with one Edward J. Williams 

13 whereby the said Robert W. Archbald and the said Edward 

14 J. Williams agreed to become partners in the purchase of a 

15 certain culm dump, commonly known as the Katydid culm 

16 dump, near Moosic, Pennsylvania, owned by the Hillside 

17 Coal & Iron Company, a corporation, and one John M. 

18 Robertson, for the purpose of disposing of said property at a 

19 profit. That pursuant to said agreement, and in furtherance 

20 thereof, the said Robert W. Archbald, on the 31st day of 

21 March, 1911, and at divers other times and at different 

22 places, did undertake, by correspondence, by personal con- 

23 ferences, and otherwise, to induce and influence, and did 

24 induce and influence, the officers of the said Hillside Coal & 


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ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


31 


Iron Company and of the Erie Railroad Company, a cor¬ 
poration, which owned all of the stock of said coal com¬ 
pany, to enter into an agreement with the said Robert W. 
Archbald and the said Edward J. Williams to sell the inter¬ 
est of the said Hillside Coal & Iron Company in the Katy¬ 
did culm dump for a consideration of four thousand and five 
hundred dollars. That during the period covering the 
several negotiations and transactions leading up to the afore¬ 
said agreement the said Robert W. Archbald was a judge 
of the United States Commerce Court, duly designated and 
acting as such judge; and at the time aforesaid and during 
the time the aforesaid negotiations were in progress the 
said Erie Railroad Company was a common carrier engaged 
in interstate commerce and was a party litigant in certain 
suits, to wit, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company et al. 
v. The Interstate Commerce Commission, No. 38, and the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company et al. v. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission, No. 39, then pending in the United 
States Commerce Court; and the said Robert W. Archbald, 
judge as aforesaid, well knowing these facts, willfully, un¬ 
lawfully, and corruptly took advantage of his official posi¬ 
tion as such judge to induce and influence the officials of the 
said Erie Railroad Company and the said Hillside Coal & 
Iron Company, a subsidiary corporation thereof, to enter 


32 

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24 


EOBEET W. ABCHBALD. 


into a contract with him and the said Edward J. Williams, 
as aforesaid, for profit to themselves, and that the said Rob¬ 
ert W. Archbald, then and there, through the influence 
exerted by reason of his position as such judge, willfully, 
unlawfully, and corruptly did induce the officers of said Erie 
Railroad Company and of* the said Hillside Coal & Iron 
Company to enter into said contract for the consideration 
aforesaid. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 
guilty of misbehavior as such judge and of a high crime and 
misdemeanor in office. 

ARTICLE 2. 

That the said Robert W. Archbald, on the 1st day of 
August, 1911, was a United States circuit judge, and, having 
been duly designated as one of the judges of the United 
States Commerce Court, was then and there a judge of said 
court. 

That at the time aforesaid the Marian Coal Company, 
a corporation, was the owner of a certain culm bank at 
Taylor, Pennsylvania, and was then and there engaged in the 
business of washing and shipping coal; that prior to that time 
the said Marian Coal Company had filed before the Inter¬ 
state Commerce Commission a complaint against the Dela¬ 
ware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company and five 


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EOBEET W. AECHBALD. 


33 


other railroad companies as defendants, charging said de¬ 
fendants with discrimination in rates and with excessive 
charges for the transportation of coal shipped by the said 
Marian Coal Company over their respective lines of road; 
that all of the said defendant companies were common car¬ 
riers engaged in interstate commerce. That the decision of 
the said case by the Interstate Commerce Commission at the 
instance of either party thereto was subject to review, under 
the law, by the United States Commerce Court; that one 
Christopher G. Boland and one William P. Boland were 
then the principal stockholders of the said Marian Coal 
Company and controlled the operation of the same, and they, 
the said Christopher G. Boland and the said William P. 
Boland, employed one George M. Watson as an attorney to 
settle the case then pending as aforesaid in the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and to sell to the Delaware, Lacka¬ 
wanna & Western Railroad Company two-thirds of the 
stock of the said Marian Coal Company; and at the time 
aforesaid there was pending in the United States Commerce 
Court a certain suit entitled the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
Company et al. v. the Interstate Commerce Commission, No. 
38, to which suit the said Delaware, Lackawanna & Western 
Railroad Company was a party litigant. 

H. Rept. 946,62-2-5 


34 

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ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


That the said Robert W. Archbald, being judge as 
aforesaid and well knowing these facts, did, then and there, 
engage, for a consideration, to assist the said George M. 
Watson to settle the aforesaid case then pending before the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and to sell to the said 
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company the 
said two-thirds of the stock of the said Marian Coal Com¬ 
pany, and in pursuance of said engagement the said Robert 
W. Archbald, on or about the 10th day of August, 1911, 
and at divers other times and at different places, did under¬ 
take, by correspondence, by personal conferences, and other¬ 
wise, to induce and influence the officers of the Delaware, 
Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company to enter into 
an agreement with the said George M. Watson for the settle¬ 
ment of the aforesaid case and the sale of said stock of the 
Marian Coal Company; and the said Robert W. Archbald 
thereby willfully, unlawfully, and corruptly did use his influ¬ 
ence as such judge in the attempt to settle said case and to 
sell said stock of the said Marian Coal Company to the Dela¬ 
ware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 
guilty of misbehavior as such judge and of a high crime and 
misdemeanor in office. 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


35 


1 ARTICLE 3. 

2 That the said Robert W. Archbald, being a United 

3 States circuit judge and a judge of the United States Com- 

4 merce Court, on or about October 1, 1911, did secure from 

5 the Lehigh Valley Coal Company, a corporation, which 

6 coal company was then and there owned by the Lehigh 

7 Valley Railroad Company, a common carrier engaged in 

8 interstate commerce, and which railroad company was at 

9 that time a party litigant in certain suits then pending in 

10 the United States Commerce Court, to wit, The Baltimore 

11 & Ohio Railroad Company et al. v. Interstate Commerce 

12 Commission et ah, No. 38, and The Lehigh Valley Rail- 

13 road Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, et ah, 

14 No. 49, all of which was well known to said- Robert W. 

15 Archbald, an agreement which permitted said Robert W. 

16 Archbald and his associates to lease a culm dump, known as 

17 Packer No. 3, near Shenandoah, in the State of Pennsyl- 

18 vania, which said culm dump contained a large amount of 

19 coal, to wit, 472,670 tons, and which said culm dump the 

20 said Robert W. Archbald and his associates agreed to 

21 operate and to ship the product of the same exclusively 

22 over the lines of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company; 

23 and that the said Robert W. Archbald unlawfully and cor- 


36 

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ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


ruptly did use his official position and influence as such judge 
to secure from the said coal company the said agreement. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archhald was and is 
guilty of misbehavior as such judge and of a misdemeanor 
in such office. 

ARTICLE 4. 

That the said Robert W. Archhald, while holding the 
office of United States circuit judge and being a member 
of the United States Commerce Court, was and is guilty of 
gross and improper conduct, and was and is guilty of a 
misdemeanor as said circuit judge and as a member of said 
Commerce Court in manner and form as follows, to wit: 
Prior to and on the 4th day of April, 1911, there was 
pending in said United States Commerce Court the suit of 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission. Said suit was argued and submitted 
to said United States Commerce Court on the 4th day of 
April, 1911; that afterwards, to wit, on the 22d day of 
August, 1911, while said suit was still pending in said court, 
and before the same had been decided, the said Robert W r . 
Archbald, as a member of said United States Commerce 
Court, secretly, wrongfully, and unlawfully did vfrite a 
letter to the attorney for the said Louisville & Nashville 
Railroad Company requesting said attorney to see one of 


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ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


37 


the witnesses who had testified in said suit on behalf of 
said company and to get his explanation and interpretation 
of certain testimony that the said witness had given in said 
suit, and communicate the same to the said Eohert W. 
Archbald, which request was complied with by said attorney; 
that afterwards, to wit, on the 10th day of January, 1912, 
while said suit was still pending, and before the same had 
been decided by said court, the said Eohert W. Archbald, 
as judge of said court, secretly, wrongfully, and unlawfully 

again did write to the said attorney that other members of 

• 1 

said United States Commerce Court had discovered evidence 
on file in said suit detrimental to the said railroad company 
and contrary to the statements and contentions made by the 
said attorney, and the said Eohert W. Archbald, judge of 
said United States Commerce Court as aforesaid, in said 
letter requested the said attorney to make to him, the said 
Eohert W. Archbald, an explanation and an answer thereto; 
and he, the said Eohert W. Archbald, as a member of said 
United States Commerce Court aforesaid, did then and 
there request and solicit the said attorney for the said rail¬ 
road company to make and deliver to the said Eohert W. 
Archbald a further argument in support of the contentions 
of the said attorney so representing the said railroad com- 


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pany, which request was complied with by said attorney, 
all of which on the part of said Robert W. Archbald was 
done secretly, wrongfully, and unlawfully, and which was 
without the knowledge or consent of the said Interstate 
Commerce Commission or its attorneys. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 
guilty of misbehavior in office, and was and is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 

ARTICLE 5. 

That in the year 1904 one Frederick Warnke, of 
Scranton, Pennsylvania, purchased a two-thirds interest in 
a lease on certain coal lands owned by the Philadelphia & 
Reading Coal & Iron Company, located near Lorberry 
Junction in said State and put up a number of improve¬ 
ments thereon and operated a culm dump located on said 
property for several years thereafter; that operations were 
carried on at a loss; that said Frederick Warnke thereupon 
applied to the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Com¬ 
pany for the mining maps of the said land covered by the 
said lease, and was informed that the lease under which he 
claimed had been forfeited two years before it was assigned 
to him and his application for said maps was therefore de¬ 
nied; that said Frederick Warnke then made a proposition 
to George F. Baer, president of the Philadelphia & Reading 


BOBEBT W. ABCHBALD. 


39 


1 Railroad Company and president of the Philadelphia & 

2 Reading Coal and Iron Company, to relinquish any claim 

3 that he might have in this property under the said lease, pro- 

4 vided that the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Com- 

5 pany would give him an operating lease on what was known 

6 as the Lincoln culm bank located near Lorberry; that said 

7 George F. Baer referred said proposition to one W. J. 

8 Richards, vice president and general manager of the Phila- 

9 delphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company, for consideration 

10 and action; that the general policy of the said coal com- 

11 pany being adverse to the lease of any of its culm banks, 

12 the said George P. Baer and the said W. J. Richards de- 

13 dined to make the lease, and the said Frederick Warnke 

14 was so advised; that the said Frederick Warnke then made 

15 several attempts, through his attorneys and friends, to have 

16 the said George F. Baer and the said W. J. Richards recon- 

17 sider their decision in the premises, but without avail; that 

18 on or about November 1, 1911, the said Frederick Warnke 

19 called upon Robert W. Archbald, who was then and now is 

20 a United States circuit judge, having been duly designated 

21 as one of the judges of the United States Commerce Court, 

22 and asked him, the said Robert W. Archhald, to intercede 

23 in his behalf with the said W. J. Richards; that on Novem- 

24 her 24, 1911, the said Robert W. Archhald, judge as 


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aforesaid, pursuant to said request, did write a letter to the 
said W. J. Richards requesting an appointment with the said 
W. J. Richards; that several days thereafter the said Robert 
W. Archbald called at the office of the said W. J. Richards 
to intercede for the said Frederick Wamke; that the said 
W. J. Richards then and there informed the said Robert W. 
Archhald that the decision which he had given to the said 
Wamke must be considered as final, and the said Archbald 
so informed the said Warnke; that the entire capital stock 
of the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company is 
owned by the Reading Company, which also owns the 
entire capital stock of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad 
Company, which last-named company is a common carrier 
engaged in interstate commerce. 

That the said Robert W. Archbald, judge as aforesaid, 
well knowing all the aforesaid facts, did wrongfully attempt 
to use his influence as such judge to aid and assist the said 
Frederick Warnke to secure an operating lease of the said 
Lincoln culm dump owned by the Philadelphia & Reading 
Coal & Iron Company, as aforesaid, which lease the officials 
of the said Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Company 
had theretofore refused to grant, which said fact was also 
well known to the said Robert W. Archbald. 


ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


41 


1 That the said Robert W. Archbald, judge as aforesaid, 

2 shortly after the conclusion of his attempted negotiations 

3 with the officers of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad 

4 Company and of the Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron 

5 Company, aforesaid, in behalf of the said Frederick Warnke, 

6 and on or about the 31st day of March, 1912, willfully, un- 

7 lawfully, and corruptly did accept, as a gift, reward, or 

8 present, from the said Frederick Warnke, tendered in con- 

9 sideration of favors shown him by said judge in his efforts 

10 to secure a settlement and agreement with the said railroad 

11 company and the said coal company, and for other favors 

12 shown by said judge to the said Frederick Warnke, a certain 

13 promissory note for five hundred dollars executed by the 

14 firm of Warnke & Company, of which the said Frederick 

15 Warnke was a member. 

16 Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 

17 guilty of misbehavior as a judge and high crimes and mis- 

18 demeanor in office. 

19 ARTICLE 6. 

20 That the said Robert W. Archbald, being a United 

21 States circuit judge and a judge of the United States Com- 

22 merce Court, on or about the 1st day of December, 1911, 

23 did unlawfully, improperly, and corruptly attempt to use 

24 his influence as such judge with the Lehigh Valley Coal 

H. Kept. 946, 62-2-6 


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Company and the Lehigh Valley Kail way Company to 
induce the officers of said companies to purchase a certain 
interest in a tract of coal land containing 800 acres, which 
interest at said time belonged to certain persons known as 
the Everhardt heirs. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 
guilty of misbehavior in office, and was and is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 

ARTICLE 7. 

That during the months of October and November, 
A. I). 1908, there was pending in the United States district 
court, in the city of Scranton, State of Pennsylvania, over 
which court Robert W. Archbald was then presiding as the 
duly appointed judge thereof, a suit or action at law, wherein 
the old Plymouth Coal Company was plaintiff and the 
Equitable Eire & Marine Insurance Company was defend¬ 
ant. That the said coal company was principally owned 
and entirely controlled by one W. W. Kissinger, which fact 
was well known to said Robert W. Archbald; that on or 
about November 1, 1908, and while said suit was pending, 
the said Robert W. Archbald and the said W. W. Rissinger 
wrongfully and corruptly agreed together to purchase stock 
in a gold-mining scheme in Honduras, Central America, for 
the purpose of speculation and profit; that in order to secure 


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the money with which to purchase said stock, the said 
Kissinger executed his promissory note in the sum of two 
thousand five hundred dollars, payable to Robert W. Arch¬ 
bald and Sophia J. Hutchison, which said note was indorsed 
then and there by the said Robert W. Archbald, for the pur¬ 
pose of having same discounted for cash; that one of the 
attorneys for said Rissinger in the trial of said suit was one 
John T. Lenahan; that on the 23d day of November, 1908, 
said suit came on for trial before said Robert W. Arch¬ 
bald, judge presiding, and a jury, and after the plaintiff’s 
evidence was presented, the defendant insurance company 
demurred to the sufficiency of said evidence and moved for 
a nonsuit, and after extended argument by attorneys for both 
pla in tiff and defendant, the said Robert W. Archbald ruled 
against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff, and there¬ 
upon the defendant proceeded to introduce evidence before 
the conclusion of which the jury was dismissed and a consent 
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for two thousand 
five hundred dollars, to be discharged upon the payment of 
two thousand one hundred and twenty-nine dollars and 
sixty-three cents if paid within 15 days from November 23„ 
1908, and on the same day judgments were entered in a 
number of other like suits against different insurance com¬ 
panies, which resulted in the recovery of about $28,000.00 
by the Old Plymouth Coal Company; that before the 


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expiration of said 15 days the said Kissinger, with 
the knowledge and consent of said Robert W. Arch- 
bald, presented said note to the said John T. Lena- 
han for discount, which was refused and which was later 
discounted by a bank and has never been paid. 

All of which acts on the part of the said Robert W. 
Archbald were improper, unbecoming, and constituted mis¬ 
behavior in his said office as judge, and render him guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 

ARTICLE 8. 

That during the summer and fall of the year 1909 
there was pending in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, in the city of Scranton, over 
which court the said Robert W. Archbald was then and 
there presiding as the duly appointed judge thereof, a civil 
action wherein the Marian Coal Company was defendant,, 
which action involved a large sum of money, and which 
defendant coal company was principally owned and con¬ 
trolled by one Christopher G. Boland and one William P. 
Boland, all of which was well known to said Robert W. 
Archbald; and while said suit was so pending the said 
Bobert W. Archbald drew a note for five hundred dollars, 
payable to himself, and which note was signed by one John 
Henry Jones and indorsed by the said Robert W. Archbald, 
and then and there during the pendency of said suit as afore- 


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said the said Robert W. Archbald wrongfully agreed and 
consented that the said note should he presented to the said 
Christopher G. Boland and the said William P. Boland, or 
one of them, for the purpose of having the said note dis¬ 
counted, corruptly intending that his name on said note would 
coerce and induce the said Christopher G. Boland and the 
said William P. Boland, or one of them, to discount the 
same because of the said Robert W. Archbald’s position as 
judge, and because the said Bolands were at that time liti¬ 
gants in his said court. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 
guilty of gross misconduct in his office as judge, and was and 
is guilty of a misdemeanor in his said office as judge. 
ARTICLE 9. 

That the said Robert W. Archbald, of the city of Scran¬ 
ton and State of Pennsylvania, on or about November 1, 
1909, being then and there a United States district judge in 
and for the middle district of Pennsylvania, in the city of 
Scranton and State aforesaid, did draw a note in his own 
proper handwriting, payable to himself, in the sum of five 
hundred dollars, which said note was signed by one John 
Henry Jones, which said note the said Robert W. Archbald 
indorsed for the purpose of securing the sum of five hundred 
dollars, and the said Robert W. Archbald, well knowing that 
his indorsement would not secure money in the usual com- 


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ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


mercial channels, then and there wrongfully did permit the 
said John Henry Jones to present said note for discount, at 
his law office, to one 0. H. Yon Storch, attorney at law and 
practitioner in said district court, which said Von Storch, a 
short time prior thereto, was a party defendant in a suit in 
the said district court presided over by said Robert W. 
Archbald, which said suit was decided in favor of the said 
Von Storch upon a ruling by the said Robert W. Archhald; 
and when the said note was presented to the said Von Storch 
for discount, as aforesaid, the said Robert W. Archhald 
wrongfully and improperly used his influence as such judge 
to induce the said Von Storch to discount same; that the 
said note was then and there discounted by the said Von 
Storch, and the same has never been paid, but is still due 
and owing. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archhald was and is 
guilty of gross misconduct in his said office, and was and is 
guilty of a misdemeanor in his said office as judge. 
ARTICLE 10. 

That the said Robert W. Archbald, while holding the 
office of United States district judge, in and for the 
middle district of the State of Pennsylvania, on or about 
the 1st day of May, 1910, wrongfully and unlawfully did 
accept and receive a large sum of money, the exact amount 
of which is unknown to the House of Representatives, from 


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one Henry W. Cannon; that said money so given by the 
said Henry W. Cannon and so unlawfully and wrongfully 
received and accepted by the said Robert W. Archbald, 
judge as aforesaid, was for the purpose of defraying the 
expenses of a pleasure trip of the said Robert W. Archbald 
to Europe; that the said Henry W. Cannon, at the time of 
the giving of said money and the receipt thereof by the said 
Robert W. Archbald, was a stockholder and officer in various 
and divers interstate railway corporations, to wit: A director 
in the Great Northern Railway, a director in the Lake Erie 
& Western Railroad Company, and a director in the Eort 
Wayne, Cincinnati & Louisville Railroad Company; that 
the said Henry W. Cannon was president and chairman of 
the board of directors of the Pacific Coast Company, a cor¬ 
poration which owned the entire capital stock of the Colum¬ 
bia & Puget Sound Railroad Company, the Pacific Coast 
Railway Company, the Pacific Coast Steamship Company, 
and various other corporations engaged in the mining of 
coal and in the development of agricultural and timber land 
in various parts of the United States; that the acceptance 
by the said Robert W. Archbald, while holding said office 
of United States district judge, of said favors from an officer 
and official of the said corporations, any of which in the 
due course of business was liable to be interested in litigation 


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ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 


pending in the said court over which he presided as such 
judge, was improper and had a tendency to and did bring 
his said office of district judge into disrepute. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 
guilty of misbehavior in office, and was and is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 

ARTICLE 11. 

That the said Robert W. Archhald, while holding the 
office of United States district judge in and for the middle 
district of the State of Pennsylvania, did, on or about the 
1st day of May, 1910, wrongfully and unlawfully accept and 
receive a sum of money in excess of five hundred dollars, 
which sum of money was contributed and given to the said 
Robert W. Archbald by various attorneys who were prac¬ 
titioners in the said court presided over by the said Robert 
W. Archbald; that said money was raised by subscription 
and solicitation from said attorneys by two of the officers 
of said court, to wit, Edward R. W. Searle, clerk of said 
court, and J. B. Woodward, jury commissioner of said court, 
both the said Edward R. W. Searle and the said J. B. 
Woodward having been appointed to the said positions by 
the said Robert W. Archbald, judge aforesaid. 


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Wherefore said Kobert W. Archbald was and is guilty 
of misbehavior in office, and was and is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 

ARTICLE 12. 

That on the 9th day of April, 1901, and for a long 
time prior thereto, one J. B. Woodward was a general at¬ 
torney for the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, a corpora¬ 
tion and common carrier doing a general railroad business: 
that on said day the said Robert W. Archbald, being then 
and there a United States district judge in and for the 
middle district of Pennsylvania, and while acting as such 
judge, did appoint the said J. B. Woodward as a jury com¬ 
missioner in and for said judicial district, and the said J. B. 
Woodward, bv virtue of said appointment and with the con¬ 
tinued consent and approval of the said Robert W. Arch¬ 
bald, held such office and performed all the duties pertaining 
thereto during all the time that the said Robert W. Arch¬ 
bald held said office of United States district judge, and that 
during all of said time the said J. B. Woodward continued 
to act as a general attorney for the said Lehigh Valley Rail¬ 
road Company; all of which was at all times well known to 
the said Robert W. Archbald. 

H. Rept. 946,62-2-7 


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Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 
guilty of misbehavior in office, and was and is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 

ARTICLE 13. 

That Robert W. Archbald, on the 29th day of March, 
1901, was duly appointed United States district judge for 
the middle district of Pennsylvania and held such office 
until the 31st day of January, 1911, on which last-named 
date he was duly appointed a United States circuit judge 
and designated as a judge of the United States Commerce 
Court. 

That during the time in which the said Robert W. 
Archbald has acted as such United States district judge and 
judge of the United States Commerce Court he, the said 
Robert W. Archbald, at divers times and places, has sought 
wrongfully to obtain credit from and through certain per¬ 
sons who were interested in the result of suits then pending 
and suits that had been pending in the court over which 
he presided as judge of the district court, and in suits pend¬ 
ing in the United States Commerce Court, of which the said 
Robert W. Archbald is a member. 

That the said Robert W. Archbald, being United States 
circuit judge and being then and there a judge of the United 
States Commerce Court, at Scranton, in the State of Pennsyl- 


BOBEBT W. AECHBALD. 


51 


1 vania, on the 31st day of March, 1911, and at divers other 

2 times and places, did undertake to carry on a general busi- 

3 ness for speculation and profit in the purchase and sale of 

4 culm dumps, coal lands, and other coal properties, and for a 

5 valuable consideration to compromise litigation pending 

6 before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in the 

7 furtherance of his efforts to compromise such litigation and 

8 of his speculations in coal properties, willfully, unlawfully, 

9 and corruptly did use his influence as a judge of the said 

10 United States Commerce Court to induce the officers of the 

11 Erie Kailroad Company, the Delaware, Lackawanna & 

12 Western Railroad Company, the Lackawanna & Wyoming 

13 Valley Railroad Company, and other railroad companies 

14 engaged in interstate commerce, respectively, to enter into 

15 various and divers contracts and agreements in which he 

16 was then and there financially interested with divers persons, 

17 to wit, Edward J. Williams, John Henry Jones, Thomas H. 

18 Jones, George M. Watson, and others, without disclosing 

19 his said interest therein on the face of the contract, but 

20 which interest was well known to the officers and agents of 

21 said railroad companies. 

22 That the said Robert W. Archbald did not invest any 

23 money or other thing of value in consideration of any interest 

24 acquired or sought to be acquired by him in securing or 


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ROBERT W. ARCHBALD. 

in attempting to secure such contracts or agreements or 
properties as aforesaid, but used his influence as such judge 
with the contracting parties thereto, and received an interest 
in said contracts, agreements, and properties in consideration 
of such influence in aiding and assisting in securing same. 

That the said several railroad companies were and are 
engaged in interstate commerce, and at the time of the exe¬ 
cution of the several contracts and agreements aforesaid and 
of entering into negotiations looking to such agreements had 
divers suits pending in the United States Commerce Court, 
and that the conduct and efforts of the said Robert W. 
Archbald in endeavoring to secure and in securing such con¬ 
tracts and agreements from said railroad companies was 
continuous and persistent from the said 31st day of March, 
1911, to about the 15th day of April, 1912. 

Wherefore the said Robert W. Archbald was and is 
guilty of misbehavior as such judge and of misdemeanors 
in office. 

O 


LB S ’12 























































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